Blockchain protocols, originating from Bitcoin, have established a new model of trust through decentralization. Many new protocols have been proposed recently that scale the throughput of the blockchain with available bandwidth. However, these scalable consensus protocols are becoming increasingly complex, making it more and more difficult to verify their end safety and liveness guarantees. We propose a novel protocol OHIE for permissionless blockchains, with an explicit goal of aiming for simplicity. OHIE composes as many parallel instances of Bitcoin's original (and simple) backbone protocol as needed to achieve near-optimal throughput (i.e., utilizing within a constant factor of the available bandwidth). OHIE tolerates a Byzantine adversary with fraction f < 1 2 of the computation power. We formally prove safety and liveness properties of OHIE. Our proof invokes previously established properties of Bitcoin's backbone protocol as a black-box, given the modular design of OHIE. In our experimental evaluation with up to 50, 000 nodes, OHIE achieves near-optimal throughput, and provides better decentralization of at least about 20x over prior works.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain protocols power several open computational platforms, which allow a network of nodes to agree on the state of a distributed ledger periodically. The distributed ledger provides a total order over facts called transactions. Nodes connect to each other via an open peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay network, which is permissionless: it allows any computer to connect and participate in the computational servive without registering its identity with a centralized party. A blockchain consensus protocol enables every node to confirm a set of transactions periodically, batched into chunks called blocks. The protocol ensures that nodes following the protocols should all agree on the same total ordering of the blocks they confirm, and that the set of confirmed blocks do not change once confirmed. The earliest such protocol was proposed in Bitcoin [42] , and has spurred interest in many blockchains platforms since.
The seminal Bitcoin protocol, published about a decade ago, laid some of the key foundations for blockchain protocols [42] . For example, commonly inherited design aspects from Bitcoin include its use of proof-of-work (PoW) and the associated incentive mechanism. But as Bitcoin gained popularity, its low throughput has been cited as glaring concern resulting in high costs per transaction [12] . Currently, Ethereum and Bitcoin process less than 5 KB or 10 transactions per second on average, which is 1000x lower than the average bandwidth available in their respective P2P network [15] , [21] . Many recent research efforts have thus focused on improving transaction throughput, resulting in a series of beautiful designs for permissionless blockchains [3] , [14] , [16] , [23] , [30] , [31] , [36] , [37] , [48] , [50] .
Bitcoin's core consensus protocol still stands out in one critical aspect: it is remarkably simple. The core backbone protocol-called Nakamoto consensus-can be described in a few lines of pseudo-code. Its simplicity makes it extensively amenable to re-parameterization in hundreds of deployments, and more importantly, a series of formal proofs (under different settings) of its end-to-end safety guarantees have been carefully established [19] , [20] , [28] , [43] .
The importance of keeping constructions simple enough to admit formal proofs cannot be overemphasized. Consensus protocols can be notoriously difficult to analyze: For instance, recently a design flaw in a celebrated 1 protocol [32] for highly-efficient Byzantine consensus has surfaced [2] a decade after its original proposal, and a fix is yet to be published. Proofs of end guarantees are especially important to protocols that are difficult to upgrade once deployed. Upgrades of blockchain protocols after deployment (i.e., "hard forks") cause both philosophical disagreements as well as financial impact.
Many recent high-throughput blockchain protocols do not come with end-to-end security proofs -sometimes they only prove certain internal properties of the protocol, together with informal arguments towards the end guarantees that users care about. As an example, Conflux [36] is a recent blockchain protocol with impressive throughput. It considers an adversary with a fraction f ∼ 1 2 computational power, while providing informal correctness arguments (Section 3.3 in [36] ). However, as we show in the Appendix B, when the throughput of Conflux increases, the f it tolerates gradually decreases, and in the limit may even approach zero. Such an undesirable property is hard to discover via informal arguments. Conflux itself presented attacks on a prior protocol (c.f. Phantom [48] ) that informally argued its security without proofs. Our goal. The goal of this work is to develop a simple blockchain consensus protocol, which should admit an end-to-end proof of safety and liveness, while retaining the desirable qualitative properties achieved by stateof-the-art blockchain protocols. Specifically, we aim to achieve: 1) Near-optimal resilience: Tolerate an adversarial computational power fraction f close to 1 2 , which is near-optimal; 2) Near-optimal throughput: Achieve near-optimal throughput, in terms of transactions processed per second. Note that the available network bandwidth in the P2P network constitutes a trivial throughput upper bound for all blockchain protocols. Our protocol aims to have a throughput that is within some small constant factor of the available bandwidth; 3) Decentralization: Many (hundreds of) dynamically selected block proposers/generators should be able to add blocks to the blockchain per second, rather than having one leader or a small committee add blocks, for example. More block proposers make transactions less susceptible to censorship [38] , [39] , and a DoS attack against a small number of nodes will no longer impact the availability of the entire system [26] .
Our approach. This work proposes OHIE, a novel and simple blockchain protocol for the permissionless setting. Our protocol adheres to the key principle of keeping the design modular. Specifically, we show a simple construction to compose many parallel instances of the Nakamoto consensus protocol. In doing so, we address two key issues. First, we ensure that the adversary gains no advantage in trying to bias its computational power towards any subset of the parallel "chains". This may appear straight-forward retrospectively, given that our construction aims to be simple. But, we point that multiple prior works have provided related constructions without proofs on liveness and safety [35] , [36] , [46] , [48] , many of which are susceptible to such attacks upon closer inspection [36] , [48] . Second, we show how to securely arrive at a global order for blocks across all the parallel chains. This guarantee is analogous to a standard notion of consistency [34] that avoids conflicts across concurrently confirmed blocks, and is a useful abstraction for general-purpose computation running on the blockchain (e.g. smart contracts). The modularity of OHIE admits a reduction proof of its safety and liveness properties to those of Nakamoto consensus. Our proof invokes existing theorems [43] on Nakamoto consensus as black-boxes, making our proof rather simple and streamlined. We provide full safety and liveness proofs in Appendix A.
In terms of its qualitative properties, contrasting to many prior scaling solutions which tolerate f < 1 3 , OHIE achieves near-optimal resilience and can tolerate f close to 1 2 (see Theorem 3 in Appendix A). The number of parallel chains in OHIE depends only on the available bandwidth, and not on any other parameters such as block size. By running as many chains as the network permits (typically 1000 or more), OHIE achieves (as shown in our experiments) near-optimal throughput. Finally, since we rely on parallel chains to achieve good throughput, we can use rather small block sizes (e.g., 20KB). Together with the large number of parallel chains, in each second, OHIE allows hundreds of miners to add new blocks to the blockchain, achieving excellent decentralization properties. Experimental results. We have implemented a prototype of OHIE, and we plan to make the source code publicly available. We evaluate it on Amazon EC2 with up to 50, 000 nodes successfully, similar to the setup reported in prior works [23] , [36] . Our evaluation first shows that OHIE achieves near-optimal throughput, which scales linearly with bandwidth, as is the case with state-of-the-art protocols [16] , [23] , [31] , [37] , [50] . For example, under configurations with 8-20 Mbps per-node bandwidth, OHIE achieves a throughput of about 4-10 Mbps transaction throughput 2 . Such throughput is about 6 times of the throughput of AlgoRand [23] and 1.5 times of the throughput of Conflux [36] (under similar settings). Second, regardless of the throughput of OHIE, the confirmation latency for blocks in OHIE is always under 10 minutes, for security parameters comparable to Bitcoin and Ethereum deployments. (The confirmation latencies in Bitcoin and Ethereum are 60 minutes and 3 minutes, respectively.) Finally, our experiments show that the decentralization factor of OHIE is at least about 20x of all prior works.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
System model. Throughout this paper, we model hash functions as random oracles. We consider the same permissionless setup as in Bitcoin, where nodes have no pre-established identities. We use standard proof-ofwork (PoW) puzzles, a form of sybil resistance, to limit the adversary by computation power. Our setup assumes:
• Honest nodes form a well-connected synchronous P2P overlay network, i.e., a honest node can broadcast a single block of small size with a maximum latency of δ to other honest nodes; • The entire network has total n units of computational power, and some reasonable estimation of n is known. Out of all the computational power in the system, the Byzantine adversary controls total f n units of computational power, with f being any constant below 1 2 . The adversary can deviate arbitrarily from the prescribed protocol. • An initial trusted setup bootstraps a small-sized public data in "genesis blocks".
The first assumption above implies that small blocks (say 20 KB) can be propagated to other honest nodes within a known maximum delay. Our protocol, much like Bitcoin, can tolerate variations in the actual propagation delay. Network partitioning attacks can delay block delivery arbitrarily and can cause honest nodes to lose complete inter-connectivity [6] . Defences to mitigate these attacks are an important area of research; however, they are outside the scope of the design of the consensus protocol. If the network becomes completely asynchronous, blockchain consensus is considered impossible [43] . In the presence of partitions, the CAP theorem suggests that protocols can either choose liveness or safety, but not both [24] , [25] ; we choose liveness-the same as in Nakamoto consensus.
We assume that a secure procedure to estimate the total computation power exists a-priori [20] . Standard PoW schemes help ascertaining this periodically. For instance, in Bitcoin, the rate of PoW solutions is adjusted to be approximately 10 minutes, which implicitly estimates the hashrate (computational power) in the network and then sets the puzzle difficulty accordingly. We can use the same mechanism in our design.
The last assumption on "genesis blocks" is the same as in most blockchain protocols, including Bitcoin. While this assumption could be avoided by using primitives that bootstrap securely from the other listed assumptions [5] , [27] , [50] , we choose to simply rely on this one-time initial setup. The trusted setup runs in a few seconds.
Problem definition.
A blockchain protocol should enable any node at any given point of time to output a sequence of total-ordered blocks, which we call the sequence of confirmed blocks (or SCB in short). For example, in the Bitcoin protocol, the SCB is simply the blockchain itself after removing the last 6 blocks. Safety and liveness, in the context of blockchain protocols, correspond to the following Consistency and Quality-Growth properties of the SCB, respectively:
• (Consistency) Consider the SCB S 1 on any node v 1 at any time t 1 , and the SCB S 2 on any node v 2 at any time t 2 . (Here v 1 may or may not equal to v 2 , and t 1 may or may not equal to t 2 .) Then either S 1 is a prefix of S 2 or S 2 is a prefix of S 1 . • (Quality-Growth) On any given honest node, for some constant c and in every time window of length T (where T is not too small), there are at least c · T honest blocks newly added to its SCB. Here, honest blocks refer to blocks generated by honest nodes.
Note that some previous works (e.g., [19] ) separately consider chain quality and chain growth. Since these two properties are both about liveness of the blockchain protocol, we combine them into the Quality-Growth property, to simplify the framework.
Having Consistency and Quality-Growth in a blockchain protocol will be sufficient to enable a wide range of different applications on top of the blockchain protocol. For example, Consistency prevents doublespending in a cryptocurrency-if two transactions spend the same coin, all nodes honor only the first transaction in the total order. Similarly, any "conflicting" state updates by smart contracts running on the blockchain can be ordered consistently by all nodes, by following the ordering in the SCB. Note that ensuring a total order is key to supporting many different consistency properties [8] , [33] , [34] for applications running on the blockchain (including for smart contracts [4] ). It is well known that such desirable properties are highly application-dependent in practice [7] , [49] .
III. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
As explained in Section I, OHIE composes k (e.g., k = 1000) parallel instances of the Nakamoto consensus protocol. We also call these k parallel instances as k parallel chains. Each chain has a distinct genesis block, and the chains have ids from 0 to k − 1 (which can come from the lexicographic order of all the genesis blocks). Within each chain, we follow the longest-pathrule in Nakamoto consensus. 3 Though alternatives are possible, we use Nakamoto consensus because its endto-end guarantees have been carefully proved in multiple works [19] , [20] , [28] , [43] under different settings. In OHIE, miners will extend the k chains concurrently, while keeping the probability of concurrent extensions on any individual chain small.
A. Security of Individual Chains
An immediate issue with having multiple (k > 1) chains is that the adversary may focus all its computational power onto one chain and attack that chain. Honest miners split their mining power across k chains, so each individual chain will have (1 − f )n/k honest mining power, making it easy for an attacker to have a majority computation power on at least one chain.
Splitting the adversarial power. To overcome this issue, we apply the following simple trick: We use the last log 2 k bits of the hash of the block to index to one of the k chains, and the block will be assigned to that chain. In Nakamoto consensus, the hash of a valid block should have at least log 2 1 q leading zeroes, which corresponds to the puzzle difficulty. The mining success probability q is the probability that a single hash operation yields a valid block. In our design, for a block to hash to one specific chain i, the last log 2 k bits should equal the value i. Hence the probability that a single hash operation generates a valid block for any given chain is exactly log 2 1 qk , assuming that the hash has uniformly random output bits.
One may wonder whether this simple construction admits any advantage for the adversary. Note that the probabilistic process of mining blocks on any specific chain i in OHIE is identical to that in Nakamoto consensus: To see this, fix the chain id to (say) 0, and observe that the blocks landing on chain 0 must have log 2 1 q +log 2 k zeros in the block hash output 4 . Each chain is exactly as if we run Nakamoto consensus with higher puzzle difficulty. It follows that any probabilistic event that happens on any individual chain in OHIE happens with the same probability in Nakamoto consensus. The only caveat is that OHIE runs k instances instead of one. The PoW success probabilities are identical on all chains, but they are correlated. But we can safely bound the probability of all failure events (whether correlated or not) via a simple union bound over k chains in our proofs. Since failure probabilities are exponentially small in the security parameters of Nakamoto consensus, setting the parameters Θ(log 2 k) larger in OHIE provides the same security as in single chain Nakamoto consensus. This is formally proven in Theorem 3 (Appendix A).
One may be tempted to view our k chains as k shards [31] , [37] , [50] ; however, there are fundamental differences. A shard usually corresponds to a committee who vote/sign messages in a subsequent agreement 4 The log 2 k zeros are the last bits of the hash. For chain i, it would be log 2 1 q leading zeros and then a bit-encoding of i as the last log 2 k bits of the hash. protocol. To avoid overheads associated with large committees, protocols often need to lower their resilience on f below 1 3 . In contrast, OHIE does not have committees, and all miners works on all k chains simultaneously. Extending chains securely. In Nakamoto consensus, a new block B extends from some existing block A. The PoW puzzle computes over the block B, which contains the hash of A as a field, cryptographically binding the extension of A by B. This prevents the adversary from mining B and then claiming that B extends from some other block A = A in the future. In our design, however, a miner does not know which chain a new block will extend until it finishes the PoW puzzle, the last bits of which then determine the chain extended. So, we do not know which prior block hash to use as input to the PoW.
To deal with this, in our design, a miner uses a Merkle tree [40] to bind to the last blocks 5 of all the k chains in its local view. Specifically, let A i be the last block on chain i, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. The miner computes a Merkle tree with hash(A 0 ) through hash(A k−1 ) as the tree leaves (from left to right). The Merkle root R is included in the new block B as an input the PoW puzzle. After B is mined, the integer i corresponding to the last log 2 k bits of hash(B) determines the block (A i ) from which B extends. When disseminating B in the network, a miner includes hash(A i ) and the Merkle proof of hash(A i ) in the message. The Merkle proofs are standard, consisting of log 2 k off-path hashes [40] . They allow recipients to verify that hash(A i ) is indeed at position i in the tree with a claimed Merkle root R. (Note that the recipient will directly get the value i from the hash of B.)
As a quick comparison to Nakamoto consensus, R here serves the same role as the previous block hash in Nakamoto consensus. The key requirement of R is that it binds each successful PoW to a single block on a single chain from which it extends. Lemma 2 (Appendix A) formally proves this key property. As a result, each block extends only one chain; it does not create "forks" on two chains simultaneously [22] , for instance. So, the fork-rate on each OHIE chain is the same as a single Nakamoto instance with log 2 k higher puzzle difficulty. Diverging local views. Honest miners will always use their last blocks in their local views to construct the Merkle tree, but their local views can naturally differ at any point in time. Moreover, malicious miners can always use any block (e.g., a block not on the longest path, or a block that is on the longest path but not the last block) in constructing the Merkle tree. The resulting new blocks may not extend the last block of confirm_bar Total order of fully-confirmed blocks: B00 B10 B20 B01 B11 B21 Fig. 1 : Illustrating confirm bar under T = 2. Here Chain 0, 1, and 2 has 2, 6, and 2 partially-confirmed blocks, respectively. Only the first 2 blocks of the 6 partially-confirmed block on Chain 1 are fully-confirmed.
any chain. However, the original Nakamoto consensus protocol itself already guarantees safety and liveness under such diverging views and attack attempts. For example in Bitcoin, the adversary can already extend from incorrect blocks. But doing so has been shown to have negligible advantage in affecting liveness and safety 6 under properly chosen security parameters [28] , [43] . Since each new block in OHIE extends a unique block on a unique chain, the security of each block extension independently reduces that of block extensions on some Nakamoto instance.
B. Ordering Blocks across Chains -The Problem
With our design thus far, we have k parallel chains, where each chain viewed in isolation behave exactly the same as a standard blockchain running Nakamoto consensus. Each chain thus inherits the proven properties [43] of Nakamoto consensus. For example, with high probability, all blocks on a chain except the last T blocks (for some parameter T ) are confirmed-the ordering of these confirmed blocks on the chain will no longer change in the future. This however does not yet give us a total ordering of all the confirmed blocks across all the k chains. Recall from Section II that a node needs to generate an SCB (i.e., a total order of all confirmed blocks) satisfying Consistency and Quality-Growth. Hence, a node needs to properly order blocks on different chains.
To avoid notational collision, from this point on, we will call all blocks on a chain except the last T blocks as partially-confirmed. Once a partially-confirmed block is added to SCB, it becomes fully-confirmed.
C. Ordering Blocks across Chains -Our Starting Point
One way to design the SCB is to first include the first partially-confirmed block on each of k chains (there are total k such blocks and we order them by their chain When the chains do not have the same number of partially-confirmed blocks, we will need to impose a confirmation bar (denoted as confirm bar) that is limited by the chain with the smallest number of partially-confirmed blocks (see Figure 1 ). Blocks after confirm bar cannot be included in the total order yet.
This causes a serious problem, since with blocks extending chains at random, some chains can have more blocks than others, causing them to become more and more unbalanced over time. To illustrate this phenomenon, Figure 2 plots the difference between the number of partially-confirmed blocks in the longest chain and the corresponding number for the shortest chain as observed in our experiments. The figure shows that such difference grows unbounded as time goes. This means that as time goes on, it may take unbounded amount of time for some blocks to become fully-confirmed, which is undesirable. Next, we describe our solution. Fig. 3 : Each block has a tuple (rank, next rank). Our example here assumes that once a block is generated, it is seen by all nodes immediately. Note that OHIE does not need such an assumption. We use T = 2 in this figure.
D. Ordering Blocks across Chains -Our Approach
Imagine that the longest chain is 10 blocks longer than the shortest chain. Our basic idea is that when the next block on the shortest chain is generated, we simply view it as 10 blocks worth. This is more effective than adjusting the growth rate, since here the shortest chain will catch up as soon as one new block is added to it. Figure 3 illustrates our design in more detail. Here each block has two additional fields used for ordering blocks across chains, denoted as a tuple (rank, next rank). In the total ordering of fullyconfirmed blocks, the blocks are ordered by increasing rank values, with tie-breaking based on the chain ids. The chain id of a block is simply the id of the chain to which the block belongs. For any new block B that extends from some existing block A, we directly set B's rank to be the same as A's next rank. Putting it another way, A's next rank specifies (and fixes) the rank of B. A genesis block always has rank of 0 and next rank of 1.
Determining next rank of a new block. Properly setting the next rank of a new block B is key to our design. The miner of a new block sees all the chains, and can determine the rank of the next upcoming block on each chain (before B is generated). For example, at time t 1 in the example in Figure 3 , the miner knows that the next rank of the current last block on each of the three chains is 1, 5, and 1, respectively. Hence 1, 5, and 1 will be rank of the next upcoming block on each chain, respectively. Let x denote the maximum among these values (x = 5 in our example here). Roughly speaking, x corresponds to the "longest" chain (in terms of rank) among the k chains. Regardless of which chain the new block B ends up belonging to, we want B to help that chain to increase its rank to catch up with the "longest" chain. Hence we directly set B's next rank to be x. This will ensure that the block extending from B will have the same rank as the rank of the next upcoming block on the "longest" chain. Furthermore, we will always ensure that B's next rank is at least one larger than B's rank, regardless of x. This guarantees that the rank values of blocks on one chain will always be increasing. Finally, note that a malicious miner may lie about x, and intentionally set B's next rank incorrectly. Our full design in Section IV will deal with this.
In the example in Figure 3 , from time t 1 to t 2 , there are 3 new blocks (with tuples (1, 5), (5, 6) , and (6, 7), respectively) added to chain 0. For the first new block added, x is 5, and hence its next rank is 5. For the second new block, x is still 5, while the rank of this block is already 5. In such a case, we set this block's next rank to 6. Determining the total order. With all the rank and next rank values of the blocks, our design establishes a total order among the blocks in the following way. Consider any given honest node at any given time and its local view of all the chains. Let y i be the next rank of the last partially-confirmed block on chain i in this view. For example, at time t 4 in Figure 3 , we have y 0 = 5, y 1 = 7 and y 2 = 9. Note that the position of a partially-confirmed block on its respective chain will not change any more, and hence all y i are "stable". Let confirm bar ← min k i=1 y i . Then, the next partiallyconfirmed block on any of the chains must have a rank that is no smaller than confirm bar. This means that the node must have seen all partially-confirmed blocks whose rank is smaller than confirm bar (formal proof in Lemma 4 of Appendix A). Thus, it is safe to deem all partially-confirmed blocks whose rank is smaller than confirm bar as fully-confirmed, and include them in SCB. Finally, all the fully-confirmed blocks will be ordered by increasing rank values, with tie-breaking favoring smaller chain ids.
In Figure 3 , at time t 4 , we have confirm bar being 5. Hence the 9 partially-confirmed blocks whose rank is below 5 become fully-confirmed. The last partially-confirmed block B 15 on chain 1 is still not fully-confirmed. Intuitively, block B 15 cannot be fullyconfirmed since the third block on chain 0 may still change, and that block may need to be ordered before B 15 in SCB.
Summary. By properly setting the next rank values for the new blocks, we ensure that the chains remain balanced in terms of the rank's of the last blocks on the chains. This is regardless of how unbalanced the chains are in terms of the total number of blocks on each chain, hence avoiding the problem in Figure 2 earlier.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
OHIE runs k parallel instances of Nakamoto consensus. We will call each such instance as (p, λ , T )-Nakamoto-Consensus, where p is the probability of mining success for one hash operation, λ is the security parameter (i.e., the length of the hash output), and T is the number of blocks that we remove from the end of the chain in order to obtain partially-confirmed blocks. We also call the corresponding OHIE protocol as the (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE protocol.
Determining suitable parameters. Existing analysis shows that in Nakamoto consensus when the block interval, i.e., the expected time between two block proposals, is at least 3 times the block propagation delay δ , the resilience for f approaches 1 2 (specifically about 0.46 [28] ). Obviously block propagation delay decreases with block size. We choose the smallest block sizes of 20 KB, below which the block propagation delay does not reduce significantly, as the delay becomes network latency-bound (time to traverse multiple hops in P2P overlay) rather than bandwidth-bound. At 20 KB block size, we measured a propagation latency of about 2-3 seconds in our experiments (see Section V). Therefore, we use 20 KB blocks, with block interval on each chain being 10 seconds (3-5x the block propagation delay). To have near-optimal throughput, we run as many parallel chains as the network bandwidth permits. Section V provides some concrete examples on the k values under different bandwidth configurations. The PoW difficulty p is the same for all chains, and is adjusted the same way as in Nakamoto consensus based on the mining power. The λ and T values can be set to different values for desirable levels of failure probability, in the same way as in (p, λ , T )-Nakamoto-Consensus. Implementation overview. Figure 4 provides an overview of the entire protocol run by each node. Each node maintains a local view of all the k chains. The storage structure of each chain is identical to Nakamoto consensus 7 , and hence our description omits its details. Conceptually, there are 3 threads of execution. The Thread Mining() function mines new blocks continuously based on the present local view. The Thread onMessageRecv(. . .) deals with any new blocks received from peers or from the mining thread. It verifies the blocks, updates the local view, re-calculates the Merkle root, and sends this block out to its other peers via standard P2P gossip (omitted). The last thread called Thread OutputSCB() generates, upon request from the user at any point of time, the SCB on this node. We explain details of these next. Block generation. A node mines a new block by solving the PoW, based on the last blocks on all k chains in its view. This view is updated whenever any new blocks are mined or received by the node. We define the block with the largest next rank, out of all blocks on the k chains in this view, as the trailing block in this view. If there are multiple such blocks, we define the trailing block to be the one with the largest chain id. 7 Recall that each chains is really a tree, where blocks have edges to other blocks they extend from. We obtain the chain from the tree by following the "longest-path" (i..e, the longest path from the root to some leaf) rule in Nakamoto consensus. We refer to the leaf corresponding to the longest path as the "last" block; similarly, last T blocks refer to those T blocks nearest to the leaf on the longest path. for
all partial ← i partial i ; 12:
foreach B ∈ all partial 13:
if ( B.rank < confirm bar) 14:
then mark B "fully confirmed"; 15: 16: X ← all "fully confirmed" blocks; 17: Order X by rank, with tie-breaker 18:
favoring smaller chain id; 19: 20: return X; 21: } The MineNewBlock() function shows the procedure to mine. The B.trailing field is worth some further elaboration. As explained in Section III-D, the next rank of B should be set to be the same as the next rank of the trailing block. A naive design would be to directly include in B the next rank of the trailing block. If done this way, an attacker could pick the maximum possible value 8 for that field and claim it to be the next rank of the trailing block. Note that the next rank values for blocks on a given chain never decreases, and hence this attack exhausts the possible values for next rank, causing the chain to stop growing. To avoid this attack, we force the miner of B to specify the hash of its trailing block. When another node receives B, it will verify that this hash indeed corresponds to some existing block in its own view. This prevents the previous attack.
Finally, a malicious node can always lie about its current view, and claim some arbitrary block (or even the genesis block) as its trailing block. Theorem 3 (Appendix A), however, proves that this does not cause any problem in OHIE. Intuitively, when the adversary does this, it is simply refusing to help the chain to grow its rank to catch up with the "longest" chain in the system. But as long as one more honest block is generated for the chain, that block will advance the rank of this chain as desired.
Block attachment generation. In OHIE, when a block extends another, we do not know a-priori which block 8 The value domain for the trailing field must be finite in an actual implementation. is extended. This information is, therefore, attached separately to a block after the PoW succeeds, as shown in ConstructAttachment(). Such an attachment will also include the rank and next rank values for the block. During block propagation, a node will always propagate a block B together with some attachment for B. For each block B, we will use B to denote an attachment for B. Our implementation stores attachments alongside the block in the local view. The difference between an attachment and a block is that an attachment is not included as part of the hash input when we compute the PoW puzzle. This immediately means that the attachment is not protected by the hash against adversarial manipulation. But Lemma 2 in Appendix A will prove that the system can only find one valid attachment B for each valid block B, which follows directly from security properties of Merkle trees. This valid attachment B can be verified given the block B. Because of this property, when we refer to rank or next rank of a block B, we simply mean rank or next rank of the single valid attachment B for B. A genesis block B will have B.rank = 0, B.next rank = 1, and B.leaf = B.leaf proof = null.
Block attachment verification. Whenever a node receives a block B for the first time and some attachment B for B, the node will check the validity of B, and will discard B and B if the checks fail. The checks are implemented by the CheckValidity (B, B) function are not shown in Figure 4 , but are straight-forward. Let i be the integer corresponding to the last log 2 k bits of hash(B). First, the node will check that B.leaf indeed corresponds to some exiting block A on the i-th chain, 9 and that B.leaf is indeed the i-th leaf in the Merkle tree. Next, the node will check that B.trailing indeed corresponds to some existing block C. Finally, the node will recompute B.rank and B.next rank, based on its local A and C, and check whether the results match the values in the given B.
After all the above checks pass, the node will add B and B to it local view of the chain i, with B extending from A. Note that OHIE is not concerned with whether B results in a branch or the longest-path of chain i; once we reach the level of individual chains, the (p, λ , T )-Nakamoto-Consensus protocol takes over. Figure 4 uses add to Nakamoto chain(. . .) to write to the underlying Nakamoto storage structure, and implicitly reads from it when fetching or ordering blocks (e.g. when referring to the "last" and the "last T" blocks in function Thread OutputSCB()). Determining the total order among blocks. Consider any honest node at any given time. The Thread OutputSCB() function in Figure4 gives the pseudo-code for this honest node to generate an SCB, which directly follows the design in Section III-D. Picking transactions. When two transactions are the same (or in conflict) in the SCB , a deterministic rule can be used to pick between them (e.g. first one, last one, state merge, and so on.) by the user. This choice is highly application-dependent. Nonetheless, to avoid multiple inclusions of the same transaction, miners should ideally pick different transactions to include in blocks (by implementing the function pickTX() in Figure 4 accordingly). For example, miners can sort the hash of input transactions and pick those lexicographically closest to the hash of their respective public keys. Note that this rule does not impact safety or liveness at all; it simply reduces the possibility of multiple inclusions (in different blocks) of the same transaction.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Methodology. We have implemented a prototype of OHIE in C++, with total around 4,700 lines of code. We then evaluate the performance of OHIE on Amazon's EC2 virtual machines (or EC2 instances). We rent m4.2xlarge instances in 14 cities around the globe 10 , each configured with 8 cores and 1 Gbps throughput. The average latency for one randomly chosen EC2 instance to ping another randomly chosen EC2 instance is about 90-140 ms one-way and 180-280 ms round-trip. This is consistent with observations in AlgoRand [23] , EC2 statistics reported online [1] , as well as recent ICMP ping measurements in Bitcoin and Ethereum [21] .
We perform two sets of experiments, macro and micro. Our macro experiments run 12, 000 to 50, 000 OHIE nodes on up to 1, 000 EC2 instances, in which we measure the end performance of OHIE. Our micro experiments run 1, 000 OHIE nodes on 20 EC2 instances, to determine OHIE internal parameters and to sanity check our end results, while avoiding excessive monetary expenses on EC2. In all experiments, the nodes form a P2P overlay by each node connecting to 8 randomly selected peers, and per-node bandwidths are at most 20Mb/s (or 2.5MB/s), since we run 50 nodes per EC2 instance. This setup is the same as in the experiments of AlgoRand [23] and Conflux [36] . All results reported are averaged over 5 runs, each lasting until all measurements stabilize.
A. Determining Block Size and Interval
We first examine the block propagation delay (BPD) for a single block (with no parallel chains) to reach 99% of the nodes. In our micro experiments, single block BPD values are consistently about 1-2 seconds for 10-20 KB blocks. Specifically, Figure 5 shows that with all bandwidths between 8-20 Mbps and 20 KB blocks, the BPD is between 1.7-1.9 seconds.
This BPD does not increase significantly as the network size increases. For example, in our macro experiments with 50, 000 nodes, the BPD values are about 3.2 seconds for 10-20 KB blocks (not shown in the figure) . This is expected since the the average number of hops between two nodes in our P2P overlay setups of 1, 000 nodes and 50, 000 nodes are about 3.3 and 5.1, respectively. This is also consistent within theoretical expectations on random graphs, where the average number of hops between an average pair of nodes is on the order of log n/ log d, where d = 8 and n = 1, 000-50, 000 in our setup. As another reference point, Bitcoin (Ethereum) have n = 12, 000 (35, 000) and d = 16 (25) .
Our implementation of block propagation needs to exchange some protocol messages between nodes. Hence while smaller blocks give better BPD, they also result in poorer bandwidth utilization. Taking all these factors into account and based on our micro experiment results ( Figure 5 and Figure 6 ), we choose a block size of 20 KB. We then set the PoW difficulty such that the block interval is 10 seconds on each chain (i.e., more than 3-5 times the BPD). 
B. Efficient Parallel Propagation of Blocks
At the network level, a key difference between OHIE and other high-throughput protocols (e.g. Algorand [23] ) is that with its large number of parallel chains, OHIE propagates a large number of small blocks in parallel (e.g., 50 blocks, each of size 20 KB). In contrast, protocols such as Algorand usually propagate a single large block (e.g., of size 1 MB). The critical empirical question is whether the BPD increases substantially when many blocks are being propagated concurrently on the network, as compared to propagating a single block.
We use micro experiments to test this critical networklevel property. Specifically, for block sizes ranging from 5KB to 64KB, we compare in Figure 5 (i) the BPD when a single block is being propagated with (ii) the average BDP when many (5 to 350) blocks are being propagated in parallel. For instance with 20 KB blocks and 20 Mbps available bandwidth, Figure 5 shows that even 60 parallel blocks per second will not cause any substantial increase in BPD. After 60 blocks/second, the BPD becomes bandwidth-bound rather than latencybound, and increases roughly linearly with the parallel block rate. Figure 6 present the same results as in Figure 5 , but from a different perspective. In particular, Figure 6 shows that as long as block size is at least 20 KB, we can hope OHIE to eventually achieve a throughput that is within a (small) factor of about 2 from the optimal (i.e., effectively utilizing about 50% of the available bandwidth) by doing a sufficiently large number of parallel propagations as determined by the available bandwidth, while with minimal negative impact on BPD. C. End-to-end Performance of OHIE Our use macro experiments to establish the end-to-end performance of OHIE, by answering the following:
(a) Is the throughput of OHIE near-optimal? (b) What is the decentralization factor in OHIE? (c) Is block confirmation latency acceptable in OHIE?
We report our results running 12, 000 nodes on 1000 EC2 instances at 4 different bandwidths configurations: 8, 12, 16, and 20 Mbps. We run an additional macro experiment at 50, 000 nodes on 1000 EC2 instance with 20 Mbps bandwidth. We find that the results with 50, 000 nodes are within 1% of the results for the corresponding experiment with 12, 000 node. Hence we will only report the results with 12, 000 nodes. For all our experiments here, the block size is fixed at 20 KB, and the block interval on each chain is 10 seconds.
Near-optimal throughput. We first measure the throughput of OHIE under different available bandwidth configurations, and examine how its throughput scales. By the design of OHIE, we set k according to the available bandwidth. Specifically in our experiments, we set k to be about 0.5 × block interval × (available bandwidth/block size). For example for provisioned per-node bandwidth of 8 Mbps (1 MB/s), we configure k = 256 parallel chains. Figure 7 shows that the throughput of OHIE indeed scales up roughly linearly with the available bandwidth in the system. Furthermore, its throughput is always within a (small) factor of about 2 from the theoretical optimal (i.e., the available bandwidth). At an available bandwidth of 20 Mbps, the throughput of OHIE is about 9.68 Mbps, or about 2, 420 transactions per second (assuming 500-byte average transaction size as in Bitcoin). As a quick comparison, OHIE achieves 6x better throughput than Algorand [23] under comparable setup. Compared to Conflux at 20 Mbps available bandwidth, OHIE has 1.5x better throughput. Note that at the same time, Conflux and Algorand tolerate f < 0.15 (Appendix B) and f < 1/6 [23] respectively, whereas OHIE tolerates f ∼ 0.46 at the current configuration [28] . Decentralization factor. Another significant advantage of OHIE is its decentralization factor, in terms of the number of distinct confirmed blocks per second. Figure 8a shows that the decentralization factor of OHIE increases linearly with the available bandwidth. This is expected since the number of parallel blocks (or chains) increases as the available bandwidth increases.
In particular, Figure 8a shows that OHIE achieves a decentralization factor of about 61.8 at 20 Mbps available bandwidth, which is very close to the theoretically expected. Table I in Section VI confirms that our decentralization factor is at least about 20x higher than prior works. The key reason for such a high decentralization factor is that OHIE uses small blocks of 20 KB size, where prior works use much larger blocks (few MB) to scale throughput [23] , [31] , [37] , [50] . Confirmation latency. Let T be the number of blocks that we remove from the end of the chain in order to obtain partially-confirmed blocks in each individual chain in OHIE. For example, Bitcoin and Ethereum use T = 6 and T = 10 to 15, respectively. For comparable security, our analysis (Theorem 3 in Appendix A) suggests using a T value that is Θ(log 2 k) larger. Hence we use T = 20 to 30 in OHIE, as long as k ≤ 16, 000. Figure 8b plots the average time for a block to become partially-confirmed and fully-confirmed on all nodes. These results show that a block takes about 1-5 minutes to become partially-confirmed, and then about another 2-4 minutes to become fully-confirmed. As a reference point, the confirmation latencies in Bitcoin and Ethereum are presently 60 and 3 minutes, respectively.
For a conservative T = 30, Figure 8c further confirms the above findings under different available bandwidth configurations (and the correspondingly different k values and resulting throughput as in Figure 7 ). In particular, Figure 8c shows that the confirmation latency of the blocks remains roughly the same under varying bandwidth settings and varying resulting system throughput. Putting it another way, the confirmation latency does not deteriorate as the throughput of OHIE increases. 8 Table I briefly summarizes the existing consensus protocols in the permissionless setting, and compares them on: (a) resilience on f , which may be based on computational power or pre-established stake distribution; (b) experimental throughput measured in size of transaction data confirmed per second; (c) decentralization factor, i.e., the number of block proposers accepted per unit time; (d) whether the protocol comes with a proof of end-to-end guarantees similar to ours. Nakamoto consensus. Existing deployments of Nakamoto consensus (e.g., Bitcoin) achieves only about 5 KByte/s throughput. To utilize the available bandwidth [21] , very large block sizes can be used instead. For instance, Bitcoin-NG utilizes a variant of this paradigm by having many microblocks proposed by the same proposer, after the proposer is chosen [16] . (We count all these micro-blocks as one block in our calculation of decentralization factor, since they are all proposed by the same proposer.) However, this trades-off decentralization, as a single block proposer broadcasts blocks for extended periods of time. Scaling Nakamoto consensus. To improve throughput, another widely-adopted approach is to re-parameterize Nakamoto consensus to have very small block intervals. But as the block interval gets closer to δ (i.e., c close to 1), the protocol tolerates roughly f ∼ 1 3 , and the resilience on f drops substantially thereafter [28] , [43] . This fundamentally limits how much block intervals can be reduced.
VI. RELATED WORK
A number of works have attempted to scale Nakamoto consensus with reduced block intervals, without provid-ing end-to-end proofs of liveness and safety. Building on the initial ideas of blocks referencing more than one previous blocks [35] , PHANTOM proposes a solution to total order blocks [48] . However, researchers have shown [36] a liveness attack on PHANTOM under f ∼ 1 6 . The same paper [36] also proposes a new protocol called Conflux, but again with only an informal correctness argument. We show that Conflux's resilience quickly deteriorates as its throughput increases (see Appendix B). Spectre [46] confirms blocks without guaranteeing a total order, hence the consistency provided is weaker than Nakamoto consensus. Spectre's properties may suffice for cryptocurrency payments, but for smart contracts, total ordering is key in resolving state read-write conflicts [33] , [34] and in building towards higher abstractions of consistency [4] , [14] , [31] . Byzantine agreement in permissionless setup. Several proposals employ classical Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols to achieve higher throughput [18] . BA protocols require a pre-agreed set of identities between which the protocol runs, but in the permissionless setup, no identities are pre-established. Therefore, several permissionless protocols utilizing BA protocols have to setup committees of virtual identities to run BA protocol instances. One line of work utilizes Nakamoto consensus itself to establish the identities that subsequently run BA algorithms [14] , [30] , [45] . AlgoRand utilizes a sampling technique on stake distributions with VRFs to establish committees [23] . Another line of work utilizes BA invocation in the previous round to establish committees for the next round [3] , [31] , [37] , [50] .
We point out that classical BA protocols, such as PBFT [11] , can be considerably more complex to imple- reports the fraction f of adversarial mining power or stake under which the protocol remains secure. Column "Near-optimal throughput?" reports on whether the protocol is shown to utilize a good fraction of the available bandwidth. The "Decentralization factor" column reports the maximum number of block proposers per second; here, we use the number of confirmed blocks divided by block interval as reported in experimental evaluations by the respective works. The "Liveness & safety proof?" column reports whether the protocol has proofs of properties equivalent to safety and liveness. ment and verify as compared to Nakamoto consensus. Among the prior BA-based protocols that report on implementation or experimental results (Table I) , none of them tolerates f > 1 3 . The key bottleneck reported in prior works is that of establishing (or replenishing) committees with 200-2000 identities each. This large committee size is necessary to ensure the requisite safety. The latency of this step can be between in tens of seconds [3] , [23] , minutes [37] , [50] , or hours [31] . After committees are established, BA protocols tend to have small confirmation latencies (e.g., around 10 seconds) [23] , [30] , [50] . Finally, the Hybrid Consensus design [45] does aim to tolerate f ∼ 1 2 , but it does not provide concrete parameters for implementation (e.g committee sizes), and hence it is difficult to predict the end throughput or decentralization factor. Sharding designs. A subset of BA-based design employ sharding, in which many parallel instances of BA protocols run, inheriting the advantage of lower confirmation time [31] , [37] , [50] . Sharding designs improve decentralization, as many smaller blocks are committed in parallel on different shards. However, the committee setup latencies are proportional to the total number of identities, which is linear to the number of shards. Therefore, such protocols either report running relatively small number of shards (usually no more than 16) or refreshing committees infrequently (once in few hours or days) [31] , [50] , limiting their decentralization factors.
Alternative setup and properties. We build upon the formal properties of the original Nakamoto consensus. One somewhat undesirable property of Nakamoto consensus is its limited fairness-the number of blocks mined by the adversary can be higher than its computational power. Selfish mining attacks undermine fairness in Nakamoto consensus; however, better constructions building on Nakamoto consensus are known to improve fairness [44] . Our construction and proof are modular, therefore, we believe that extending OHIE to these alternative protocols is feasible in future work. Finally, we focus on permissionless PoW blockchains, and there are other designs utilizing Proof-of-Stake [9] , [10] , [23] , [29] or assume a permissioned setting [13] , [18] , [41] .
VII. CONCLUSION
We present OHIE, a PoW blockchain consensus protocol that composes many parallel instances of Nakamoto consensus. The resulting protocol is extremely simple and modular. We have proved (in Appendix A) its safety and liveness guarantees, with near-optimal resilience on f . Our experiments show that OHIE achieves nearoptimal throughput, as well as at least about 20x better decentralization over prior works.
APPENDIX

A. Security Proof
Some basic definitions. Define a tick to be the amount of time needed to do a single query to the random oracle by an honest node. Hence the adversary can query the random oracle total f n times in each tick. We allow the adversary to potentially make these f n queries sequentially, which makes our results stronger. Define ∆ to be δ divided by the duration of a tick -hence a block sent by an honest node will be received by all other honest nodes within ∆ ticks. For example, if δ is 10 seconds, and if each honest node can do 10 12 hash operations per second, then ∆ = 10 13 .
A block is an honest block if it is generated by some honest node, otherwise it is a malicious block. When we discuss two sequences of blocks S 1 and S 2 , we say that S 1 is a prefix of S 2 iff S2 is the concatenation of S 2 and some other sequence S 3 of blocks. Here S 3 may be empty -hence if S 1 is also a prefix of itself. When it is clear from the context, we sometime also use set operations over S 1 and S 2 . For example, S 1 ∩ S 2 refers to the set of common blocks in S 1 and S 2 . An existing result on Nakamoto consensus. We first state a theorem adapted from [43] , which we will invoke later in our proof as a black-box: Theorem 1. (Adapted from Corollary 3 in [43] .) Consider any given constant f < 1 2 . Then there exists p 0 = Θ( 1 ∆n ) such that for all p ≤ p 0 , the (p, λ , T )-Nakamoto-Consensus protocol satisfies all the following properties, with probability at least 1−exp(−Ω(λ ))−exp(−Ω(T )):
• (Consistency) Let S 1 (S 2 ) be the sequence of blocks on the chain on any node v 1 (v 2 ) at any time t 1 (t 2 ), excluding the last T blocks on the chain. Here v 1 may or may not equal to v 2 , and t 1 may or may not equal to t 2 . Then either S 1 is a prefix of S 2 or S 2 is a prefix of S 1 . • (Growth) On any given honest node, the length of the chain increases by at least T blocks every 2T pn ticks. • (Quality) Consider the chain on any given honest node at any given point of time. Then every T consecutive blocks in that chain contains at least (1 − f 1− f )T honest blocks. • (Quality-Growth) Consider any given honest node, and let S be the sequence of blocks on the chain on this node, excluding the last T blocks on the chain. The following property hold after the very first 2T pn ticks of the execution: In every 2T pn ticks, there are at least (1 − f 1− f )T honest blocks being newly added to S. Some basic properties in OHIE. Let h denote the total number of hash operations the system (including the honest nodes and the adversary) can do during the entire execution of OHIE. Recall that we model hash functions as random oracles. Under this model, we first prove the following basic properties in OHIE: Lemma 2. With probability at least 1 − h · exp(−Ω(λ )), all the following properties hold in OHIE: 1) For all y, the system (including both the honest nodes and the adversary) does not find x such that hash(x) = y, unless the system previously invoked hash(x). 2) The system does not find any x 1 and x 2 such that x 1 = x 2 and hash(x 1 ) = hash(x 2 ). 3) For any block B in OHIE, the system can find only a single valid block attachment B for B.
Proof. Under our simple random oracle model for hash functions, the first two properties in Lemma 2 are direct, and correspond to the pre-image resistance and collision resistance properties for h. Conditioned upon these two properties, we next prove that the third property in Lemma 2 must also hold. An attachment B consists of four fields, namely, B.leaf, B.leaf proof, B.rank, and B.next rank. We will show that for each of these four fields, the system can only find a single value that can make B valid for the given block B.
We first prove for B.leaf and B.leaf proof. Let b 1 b 2 . . . b log 2 k be the last log 2 k bits of hash(B). The system knows only a single R 0 and a single R 1 such that hash(R 0 ||R 1 ) = B.root. Similarly, the system knows only a single R 00 and R 01 such that hash(R 00 ||R 01 ) = R 0 , and so on. By continuing this argument, one can easily verify that the system knows only a single R b 1 b 2 ...b log 2 k value that can pass the Merkle tree verification step. This means that for B to be valid, B.leaf must equal this single R b 1 b 2 ...b log 2 k value. By similar arguments, the system knows only a single value for B.leaf proof that can make B valid.
Next we move on to B.rank and B.next rank. Let A be any block whose hash equals R b 1 b 2 ...b log 2 k . The system knows at most one such A. Similarly, let C be any block whose hash equals B.trailing, and the system knows at most one such C. Consider the DAG consisting of all the blocks as vertices, where for each block B, there is an edge to B from the corresponding A, and another edge to B from the corresponding C. We do a topological sort of all the vertices. We aim to prove that for any given block, there are a unique rank value and a unique next rank value that can make an attachment valid for that block.
Consider the jth block in the sequence (as obtained from the topological sort). We will do an induction on j. The induction basis for j from 1 to k trivially holds (these are the k genesis blocks). Now assume the claim hold for all j < j , and we prove the claim for j = j . Let the j th block in the sequence be B. Define A and C as earlier for this B. By inductive hypothesis, there exists only a single next rank value that can make an attachment valid for A. Putting it another way, there is a unique value for A.next rank. Similarly, there is a unique value for C.next rank. Since B.rank and B.next leaf are fully determined by A.next rank and C.next rank, we immediately know that there are a unique rank value and a unique next rank value that can make an attachment B valid for B.
Main theorem on the end guarantees of OHIE. We are now ready to state our main theorem on the end-to-end guarantees of OHIE: Theorem 3. Consider any given constant f < 1 2 . Then there exists p 0 = Θ( 1 ∆n ) such that for all p ≤ p 0 and all k ≥ 1, the (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE protocol satisfies all the following properties, with probability at least 1 − h · exp(−Ω(λ )) − k · exp(−Ω(λ )) − k · exp(−Ω(T )):
• (Consistency) Consider the SCB S 1 on any node v 1 at any time t 1 , and the SCB S 2 on any node v 2 at any time t 2 . (Here v 1 may or may not equal to v 2 , and t 1 may or may not equal to t 2 .) Then either S 1 is a prefix of S 2 or S 2 is a prefix of S 1 . • (Quality-Growth) The following property hold after the very first 2T pn ticks of the execution: On any given honest node, in every 8T pn + 2∆ ticks, there are at least k × (1 − f 1− f )T honest blocks being newly added to SCB.
To prove Theorem 3, we will first state and prove two lemmas (Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 next), which are key to the proof of Theorem 3. These two lemmas will show that conditioned upon all properties in Theorem 1 holding for each of the k chains in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE, the (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE protocol satisfies the two properties claimed by Theorem 3. Proof. Let the view of node v 1 at time t 1 be Ψ 1 , and the view of node v 2 at time t 2 be Ψ 2 . Let x 1 and x 2 be the confirm bar in Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 , respectively. Without loss of generality, assume that x 1 ≤ x 2 . Let S 1 and S 2 be the SCB in Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 , respectively. The next will prove that S 1 is a prefix of S 2 .
Let F 1 (i) be the sequence of partially-confirmed blocks on chain i in Ψ 1 . Let G 1 (i) be the prefix of F 1 (i) such that G 1 (i) contains all blocks in F 1 (i) whose rank is smaller than x 1 . Similarly define F 2 (i) and G 2 (i), where G 2 (i) contains those blocks in F 2 (i) whose rank is smaller than x 2 . We prove the following two claims:
To prove this claim, note that by the Consistency property in Theorem 1, either F 1 (i) is a prefix of F 2 (i) or F 2 (i) is a prefix of F 1 (i). If F 1 (i) is a prefix of F 2 (i), then together with the fact that x 1 ≤ x 2 , it is obvious that G 1 (i) is a prefix of G 2 (i). If F 2 (i) is a prefix of F 1 (i), let x 3 be the rank of the last block in F 2 (i). This also means that the next rank of that block is at least x 3 + 1. By our design of confirm bar, we know that x 2 ≤ x 3 + 1.
In turn, we have x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ x 3 + 1. Hence G 1 (i) must also be a prefix of G 2 (i). • For all i where 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and all block B ∈ G 2 (i) \ G 1 (i), B's rank must be no smaller than x 1 . We prove this claim via a contradiction and assume that B's rank is smaller than x 1 . Together with the fact that B is in G 2 (i) \ G 1 (i), we know that B is in F 2 (i) but not in F 1 (i). Hence F 2 (i) cannot be a prefix of F 1 (i). Then by the Consistency property in Theorem 1, F 1 (i) must be a prefix of F 2 (i). Let x 4 be the rank of the last block D in F 1 (i). Since F 1 (i) is a prefix of F 2 (i), both D and B must be in F 2 (i), and D must be before B in F 2 (i). Since the blocks in F 2 (i) must have increasing rank values, we know that D's rank must be smaller than B's.
Hence we have x 4 = D's rank < B's rank ≤ x 1 − 1, or more concisely, x 4 < x 1 − 1. On the other hand, since D's rank is x 4 , its next rank must be at least x 4 + 1. By our design of confirm bar in Ψ 1 , we know that x 1 ≤ x 4 + 1 and hence x 4 ≥ x 1 − 1. This yields a contradiction. Now we can invoke the above two claims to prove that S 1 is a prefix of S 2 . S 1 consists of all the blocks in G 1 (0) through G 1 (k − 1), while S 2 consists of all the blocks in G 2 (0) through G 2 (k − 1). Since G 1 (i) is a prefix of G 2 (i) for all i, we know that S 1 ⊆ S 2 . For all blocks in S 1 (which is the same as S 2 ∩ S 1 ), the sequence S 1 orders them in exactly the same way as the sequence S 2 . For all block B ∈ S 2 \ S 1 , by the second claim above, we know that B's rank must be no smaller than x 1 . Hence in the sequence S 2 , all blocks in S 2 \ S 1 must be ordered after all the blocks in S 2 ∩ S 1 (whose rank must be smaller than x 1 ). This completes our proof that S 1 is a prefix of S 2 .
Lemma 5. If all four properties in Theorem 1 hold for each of the k chains in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE, then (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE satisfies the Quality-Growth property in Theorem 3.
Proof. Consider any given honest node v, and any given time t 0 (in terms of ticks from the beginning of the execution) where t 0 is after the very first 2T pn ticks of the execution.
By the Quality-Growth property in Theorem 1, we know that from time t 0 to time t 1 = t 0 + 2T pn on node v, every chain in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE has at least (1 − f 1− f )T honest blocks becoming newly partiallyconfirmed. Since there are total k chains, there will be at least k · (1 − f 1− f )T such honest blocks. Let α denote the set of all these blocks. It suffices to prove that by time t 0 + 8T pn + 2∆ on node v, all blocks in α will have become fully-confirmed. Let x be the largest next rank among all the blocks in α. By definition of such x, the rank value of every block in α must be smaller than x.
Next by time t 2 = t 1 + ∆, all honest nodes will have received all blocks in α. Note that when they receive the blocks in α, those blocks may or may not be partiallyconfirmed on them (yet). By the Growth property in Theorem 1, from time t 2 to time t 3 = t 2 + 2T pn , the length of every chain on every node must grow by at least T blocks. Together with the Consistency property in Theorem 1, we know that all the blocks in α must become partially-confirmed on all honest nodes by time t 3 . Thus starting from t 3 , whenever an honest node (possible node v itself) mines a block, by the design of the (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE protocol, the next rank of the new block will be no smaller than x. We will invoke this important property later.
Next let us come back to node v, and consider any given chain (out of the k chains). From time t 4 = t 3 + ∆ to time t 5 = t 4 + 4T pn on node v, by the Growth property in Theorem 1, the length of the chain must have increased by at least 2T blocks. The first T blocks among all these blocks must have been partially-confirmed on node v at time t 5 . By the Quality property in Theorem 1, these first T blocks must contain at least
This means that these first T blocks must contain at least one honest block B that is partially-confirmed. Since B is first seen by v no earlier than t 4 , we know that B must have been generated (either by v or by some other honest node) no earlier than t 3 . By our earlier argument, the next rank of such B must be no smaller than x.
Finally, note that we actually have one such B on every chain on node v at time t 5 . This means that on node v at time t 5 , the confirm bar is at least x. We earlier showed that for all blocks in α, their rank values must all be smaller than x. Hence such a confirm bar enables all blocks in α to become fully-confirmed on node v at time t 5 . Observe that t 5 = t 0 + 8T pn + 2∆, and we are done.
Proof for Theorem 3. Using Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we are now ready to prove Theorem 3:
Proof. (for Theorem 3) We set p 0 in Theorem 3 to be the same as the p 0 in Theorem 1. Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 already show that conditioned upon all properties in Theorem 1 holding for each of the k chains in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE, the (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE protocol satisfies the Consistency and Quality-Growth properties as claimed by Theorem 3.
The rest of the proof is quite straight-forward. Conditioned upon the first two properties in Lemma 2, we intend to show that for any given chain i (0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE, its behavior is exactly the same as (p, λ , T )-Nakamoto-Consensus. Without loss of generality, let us consider chain 0 and ignore all the remaining k − 1 chains in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE. (p, λ , T )-Nakamoto-Consensus and chain 0 in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE work in exactly the same way except how the blocks are generated for the chain. The following shows that conditioned upon the first two properties in Lemma 2, the way how the blocks are generated for chain 0 in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE is equivalent to how the blocks are generated in (p, λ , T )-Nakamoto-Consensus:
• First, in (p, λ , T )-Nakamoto-Consensus, the probability of each query to the random oracle succeeding in generating a valid block is exactly p.
In (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE, in order for the block to be a valid block for chain 0, the block must have log 2 1 kp leading zeros and log 2 k trailing zeroes. Hence the probability of success here is also exactly p. • Second, in (p, λ , T )-Nakamoto-Consensus, when a block B is generated, B must extend from some existing block A, and A must be unique. 11 We can easily show that the same property holds for chain 0 in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE. Specifically, Lemma 2 tells us that the system can find only one a single valid block attachment B for B. Conditioned upon the second property in Lemma 2, the system knows only a single block A such that hash(A) = B.leaf. Furthermore, the invocations of the random oracle for generating B need to have B.root as part of the input. Conditioned upon the first property in Lemma 2, the system must know B.leaf before such invocations. In turn, the system must know the block A before all such invocations. Hence A must have been generated before B is generated. The above arguments enable us to directly apply Theorem 1 to all the chains in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE: With probability 1 − h · exp(−Ω(λ )) − k · exp(−Ω(λ )) − k · exp(−Ω(T )), all properties in Theorem 1 will hold for all k chains in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE. Here the h · exp(−Ω(λ )) term is from Lemma 2. The k · exp(−Ω(λ )) + k · exp(−Ω(T )) term is just a union bound on the probability in Theorem 1, across all the k chains in (k, p, λ , T )-OHIE. Together with Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, this completes our proof.
B. Conflux's Low Resilience
This section presents some results showing that Conflux's resilience on f quickly deteriorates as its through- 11 In particular, it is not possible for the adversary to generate a block B such that it tells one honest node that B extends from A, and tells another honest node that B extends from A . put increases.
Review of Conflux. Conflux [36] considers an adversary with a fraction f computational power, where f may approach 1 2 . The paper only provides an informal correctness argument (Section 3.3 in [36] ). In this section, we construct an attack showing that the f that Conflux can tolerate gradually decreases as Conflux throughput increases. Such an undesirable property is hard to discover via informal arguments, which highlights the importance of end-to-end proofs.
We first give a briefly review of Conflux. Conflux is based on the GHOST protocol [47] , while GHOST is an improvement over the Bitcoin protocol. Imagine for now that the Bitcoin protocol disseminates all blocks that have ever been mined, regardless of whether they are on the longest path. Let Ψ be the set of blocks that any given node have seen by any given point of time. Then all blocks in Ψ will conceptually form a direct tree, where block A has a directed edge to block B if A extends from B. With a slight abuse of notation, we also use Ψ to refer to this tree. In the Bitcoin protocol, to produce the total ordering of confirmed blocks, a node will follow the longest-path rule. Namely, the node will output the longest path (after truncating a certain number of blocks at the end) from the root to some leaf of the tree, where the leaf is chosen such that the path length is maximized.
In GHOST, rather than choosing the longest path, a node instead chooses the path in the following way. The node will start from the root A of Ψ, and then find A's child B such that B's subtree has the most blocks, as compared to the subtrees for other children of A. (Namely, B's subtree is the "heaviest".) The path now contains AB. Next, the node finds B's child C such C's subtree is the heaviest, among the subtrees for all children of B. The path now contains ABC. The process continues until we reach a leaf.
Conflux builds upon GHOST by introducing a mechanism for including all blocks in the tree in the final total ordering of blocks, rather than just the blocks on the chosen path. With such a mechanism, Conflux can now obtain much higher throughput by increasing the block generation rate. For example, in one setting, Conflux generates one 4MB block every 5 seconds, despite that the time needed to propagate a 4MB block to all nodes is around 100 seconds. (In GHOST, such high block generation rate is never helpful, since most blocks would not be on the chosen path and would be wasted.)
Setting for the attack. For simplicity, we will consider the following setting. We assume that Conflux proceeds in rounds, where each round corresponds to the time Malicious Block Honest Block round round r + 1 Fig. 9 : Adversary's attack strategy on Conflux needed to propagate a block to all nodes. In each round, an honest node will try to mine a new block, and if successfully, will propagate the new block to all other nodes. Any blocks propagated will be received by all nodes at the end of the current round. In each round, the adversary will also mine new blocks, based on what it has seen up to the previous round. Once the honest nodes send out their newly mined blocks in a given round, we assume that adversary can observe those blocks, and then potentially send out malicious blocks in response to those. We also assume that the adversary can choose to send a malicious block to some honest nodes but not others. Since an honest node always forwards all blocks it receives, those other honest nodes will still receive those malicious blocks one round later. Conflux uses a deterministic tie-breaking rule for choosing which blocks to extend from, when there are multiple candidate blocks. We follow such a design. (Randomized tie-breaking rules will actually make our attack more effective, since randomized rules will result in honest nodes splitting their computation power.) Finally, Conflux mentions a stale block detection heuristic, which we do not consider since with the large threshold used in Conflux, it is unlikely to affect our results. Significantly lowering their threshold may introduce other security vulnerabilities in Conflux.
Intuition behind the attack. Before detailing the attack, we first provide some intuitions. Our attack aims to maintain two forks that keep growing. Each fork will have some weight, which is roughly the number of blocks in that fork. Let U be any set consisting of half of all the honest nodes, and let set V containing the remaining honest nodes. Imagine that in round r, nodes in U and nodes in V are working on the two forks, respectively. We want such property to continue to hold in round r + 1. Let x A and x B be the number of honest blocks generated by nodes in U and in V , respectively. The adversary will send y A malicious blocks (extending the first fork) to nodes in U (but not nodes in V ), such that x A + y A > x B . Similarly, it sends y B malicious blocks (extending the second fork) to nodes in V , such that x B + y B > x A . Doing so will keep nodes in U and nodes in V to continue on each of the two forks, respectively, in round r + 1. If the adversary do not have enough malicious blocks to follow the above step, the attack fails. This attack is effective in Conflux but not in GHOST because with Conflux's design, high throughput is achieved by generating many block per round. For example, in one setting, Conflux generates one 4MB block every 5 seconds, while the time needed to propagate a 4MB block is around 100 seconds. This gives about 20 blocks per round. The GHOST protocol never intended to work under such parameters. Because of this particular way of achieving high throughput, in Conflux, the expectations of x A , x B , y A , and y B will all be much larger than those in GHOST. (The ratio of the expectations of the four quantities remain the same in Conflux as in GHOST.) In particular in GHOST, the expected number of malicious blocks generated by the adversary in one round is below 1, which means that it is often 0. This would foil the above attack.
Attack strategy. Start from any given round r, the following gives the detailed steps of the attack (Figure 9 ): 1) In round r, let block C be the block that all the nodes are trying to extend from. The adversary generates blocks A 1 extending from C, A 2 extending from A 1 , B 1 extending from C, and B 2 extending from B 1 . 2) At the end of round r, the adversary disseminates A 1 and A 2 to all nodes in U, and B 1 and B 2 to all nodes in V . 3) In round r + 1, all the honest nodes in U (V ) will try to extend from A 2 (B 2 ). Let x A and x B be the number of (honest) blocks generated by nodes in U and V , respectively. At the same time, the adversary will mine as many malicious blocks as it can, with odd-numbered blocks extending from A 2 , and even-numbered blocks extending from B 2 . 4) At the end of round r + 1, the adversary disseminates total max(0, x B − x A + 1) odd-numbered blocks to nodes in U. This will cause nodes in U to see more blocks extending from A 2 than blocks extending from B 2 . Hence in the next round, nodes in U will all extend from some child block A 3 of A 2 . Similarly, the adversary disseminates total max(0, x A − x B + 1) even-numbered blocks to nodes in V , so that all nodes in V will later extend from some child block B 3 of B 2 . If the adversary does not have enough blocks to disseminate in this step, the attack stops. 5) In round r + 2, all the honest nodes in U (V ) will try to extend from A 3 (B 3 ). In round r +2 and later, the adversary's strategy is similar as the above two steps, except the following. In any given round t , the adversary may not use up all the blocks it generates. Those blocks can be "saved" for later use. For example, when the adversary needs to disseminate max(0, x B − x A + 1) malicious blocks to nodes in U, those malicious blocks do not have to extend from the last block in A 1 's branchthey can extend from any block in A 1 's branch.
Results. With the above attack strategy, we use simulation to determine how long a fork the adversary can maintain. This would then correspond to the number T of blocks we need to have after a block, in order for the block to get confirmed. As a reference point, Ethereum (which is also based on the GHOST protocol [47] ) uses T = 15. We consider the top 0.01% of the fork length -this would match the 0.01% "risk tolerance" used in Conflux's evaluation [36] . We vary the expected number of blocks generated per round from 20 to 200. Out of these blocks, on expectation f fraction are malicious blocks. In one of its evaluation settings, Conflux generates one 4MB block every 5 seconds, which would roughly correspond to 20 blocks per round. Figure 10 presents our simulation results. It shows that with a target fork length of no more than 15, Conflux can only tolerate f close to 0.15 when the number of blocks per round is 20. The already low f further deteriorates quickly as the throughout of Conflux (i.e., 
